近期，会计学院吴溪教授与其他学者合作的一篇论文拟刊发于会计学领域国际顶尖期刊《Journal of Accounting and Economics》。此外，梁上坤副教授、肖土盛副教授分别与其他学者合作的两篇论文被会计学领域国际顶尖期刊《The Accounting Review》录用。
会计学院会计学科在国际学术期刊发表论文始于上世纪90年代初期。截至2018年1月，会计学院已在诸多国际知名学术期刊正式发表了三十余篇论文，其中包括会计学领域的The Accounting Review (TAR)、Journal of Accounting and Economics (JAE)、Review of Accounting Studies (RAST)、Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory (AJPT)、Management Accounting Research (MAR)、Journal of Accounting and Public Policy (JAPP)、Accounting Horizons (AH)、The International Journal of Accounting (TIJA)与财务学领域的Journal of Finance (JF)、Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (JMCB)、Journal of Corporate Finance (JCF)等重要学刊。
 Earnings Management, Audit Adjustments, and the Financing of Corporate Acquisitions: Evidence from China
Clive Lennox, Zi-Tian Wang, Xi Wu
Journal of Accounting and Economics. Feb. 2018, Volume 65 (forthcoming)
Abstract: Acquirers are motivated to overstate earnings prior to stock-financed acquisitions. We hypothesize that audits help to detect and correct such overstatements. We test this using a difference-in-differences design, which compares audit adjustments to earnings for stock-financed and cash-financed acquirers before versus after the acquisitions. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find larger downward adjustments in the audits immediately before stock-financed acquisitions. Further analysis of regulatory sanctions suggests the downward adjustments are in fact warranted, rather than auditors being overly conservative. Moreover, modifications in audit reports suggest that downward adjustments do not correct all of the reporting irregularities in audited financial statements.
 China’s Closed Pyramidal Managerial Labor Market and the Stock Price Crash Risk
Donghua Chen, Jeong-Bon Kim, Oliver Zhen Li, Shangkun Liang
The Accounting Review (forthcoming)
Abstract: Managers of China's state-owned firms work in a closed pyramidal managerial labor market. They enjoy non-transferable benefits if they choose to stay within this system. The higher up are they in this labor market hierarchy (their political ranks), the fewer are their outside employment opportunities. Due to career and wealth concerns, they are cautious and risk-averse when managing firms. We examine the effect of managers' political ranks on firms' stock price crash risk and find a negative association. This association mainly exists in firms with younger managers and managers with shorter tenure. Further, this effect is only significant in regions with weak market forces, in firms without foreign investors, without political connections, and during periods with no local government leaders' or managers' political promotions. We conclude that the political ranking system reduces the stock price crash risk.
 Long-Term Impact of Economic Conditions on Auditors’ Judgment
Xianjie He, S.P. Kothari, Tusheng Xiao, Luo Zuo
The Accounting Review (forthcoming)
Abstract: We find that economic conditions at the time an auditor enters the labor market have a long-term impact on her judgment and decision making. Specifically, engagement partners who started their career during economic downturns issue audit adjustments more frequently. For the subsample of company-years with no audit adjustments, downturn auditors are more likely to issue a modified audit opinion. In addition, companies audited by downturn auditors are less likely to violate financial reporting and disclosure regulations. Together, our findings suggest that early-career stage is a critical formative period for auditors.